Mr. Brent Brookhouse, of Bloodyelbow.com, posted a response to my original article entitled “Battle Lines Being Drawn:  Why the Muhammad Ali Act Should Apply to MMA.”  The original article can be found here:  http://mmafa.tv.previewdns.com/blog/2008/07/battle-lines-being-drawn-why-the-muhammad-ali-act-should-apply-to-mma/.  Mr. Brookhouse’s full response can be found here.  http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2008/7/2/563350/ali-act-not-a-step-in-the.  Unfortunately, Mr. Brookhouse’s entire argument is either based upon incorrect factual assumptions, or a misunderstanding of the Muhammad Ali Act itself.  I address each of Mr. Brookhouse’s contentions below.

 

1)    Long term contracts.  Initially, Mr. Brookhouse dismissed the Act’s prohibitions against “coercive” contracts by claiming, unlike boxing with long-term promotional agreements, contracts in mixed martial arts are with “sports franchises.”  Unfortunately for Mr. Brookhouse, merely stating that the UFC is a league (he says franchise, but franchises agree to cooperate with the league, he probably means league) does not make it so.  If by “league” Mr. Brookhouse means a body that governs itself, then by no means is this supposed distinction applicable to Zuffa.  Zuffa asks for permission to put on events and does so under the governance of state athletic commissions.  Furthermore, Zuffa is a promoter as defined by the Act, state regulations and even by their own contracts.  Fighters are not employees, by the terms of the UFC’s “promotional” agreements.  The Agreement between Zuffa and its fighters is named “Exclusive Promotional and Ancillary Rights Agreement” and specifically identifies fighters as independent contractors.  Thus, other than the fact that Zuffa has established a brand in the mark, “UFC”, Zuffa is not, for purposes of the Act, different from Top Rank or any other boxing promoter.  It isn’t a “league” of anything.

 

Also the Act does not limit all long term promotional contracts.  This statement suggests he has not read, or does not fully understand the Act.  In fact, the Act only prohibits certain coercive contractual provisions that force a fighter to grant a promoter future promotional rights (in excess of 12 months) as a precondition to obtaining a certain fight.  As I stated in my initial article, the Act addresses these so-called “option” contracts by installing “a time limit of one year on all promotional rights that a promoter secures” from a fighter or another promotion “as a prerequisite to the boxer participating in a particular bout.” Thus, if a promoter owns the rights to a champion, and a second fighter wants to fight the champion, then the champion’s promoter can acquire the rights to the second fighter, but only for up to 12 months.  Congress believed that the one year limitation will at least provide a fighter with the right to seek the highest bidder after one year, or provide them the option to simply select the promoter of their choosing.

 

 

The legislative history found in the Senate Report is instructive on this point, and explains the scope of the Act’s prohibitions against coercive contracts (bolded for emphasis):

 

”The Committee believes that sensible, pro-competitive limitations on these onerous practices by promoters are warranted. New section 15 would put a time limit of one year on all promotional rights that a promoter secures from a boxer (or another promoter) as a prerequisite to the boxer participating in a particular bout. This situation will generally involve a boxer being selected as an opponent/challenger by a promoter for a boxer who they already have under contract. The most common example of this is when a boxer seeks to compete against a famous champion. Currently, the champion’s promoter may require this challenger to give the promoter exclusive promotional rights on their career for an extended term of years or fights. If the boxer refuses he will be rejected from the bout. The Committee believes that no boxer should be forced to contract for long term control of the boxer’s career against the boxer’s will. In situations where a boxer is a mandatory challenger, the bill would prohibit promoters from securing promotional options from the boxer (or the boxer’s promoter). The Committee feels that the contracting requirements and limitations contained in new section 15 will protect the freedom to contract of boxers, increase competition in the sport to the benefit of fans, and reduce improper interstate restraints of trade.

 

 

It is important to note that the duration of basic boxer-promoter contracts is not limited by the bill. The Committee does not seek to limit contracts reached as a result of legitimate arms length bargaining between an unattached boxer and promoter. The one-year limitation applies only to those situations where a promoter secures promotional rights from a boxer (or another promoter), as a condition for that boxer to compete in a particular bout. The one year limitation is not intended to apply to a contract where a promoter and boxer consensually enter into a long term contract, with the first bout for the boxer being specifically named, and in which the opponent is not under contract to the promoter. The Committee notes that after the one year limitation expires, the boxer is free to then contract with whatever promoter the boxer chooses, including the promoter in question. However, the one year limitation will at least provide the boxer with the ability to seek the highest bidder for his or her services after one year, or give them the freedom to simply choose the promoter the boxer determines will best further the interest of the boxer’s career.”

 

2)    Credible rankings. Mr. Brookhouse’s comments in regards to credible rankings are the least problematic.  In mixed martial arts, there are no official rankings.  While the Act, in part, was meant to deal with the corrupt rankings the alphabet soup sanctioning bodies created, and mixed martial arts currently has no sanctioning bodies, it does have many champions for each promoter across the board.  Furthermore, the Act’s requirement of credible rankings is not only to protect against sanctioning bodies, but to protect fighters themselves from arbitrary treatment at the hands of promoters.  Without credible rankings, promoters can, and do, grant title shots based upon contractual subservience, and not purely on merit or even marketability.  Inexplicably, Mr. Brookhouse also writes that rankings and titles matter more in boxing “because title fights mean more money in boxing.”  Apparently, the contractual hammers the promoters employ in mixed martial arts keeps pay much lower in mixed martial arts, and in Mr. Brookhouse’s view, this is a good thing.  Mr. Brookhouse then concludes that in any event, promoters won’t devalue their titles by employing less than worthy opponents.  In response, I say only, has Mr. Brookhouse been watching the latest offerings of mixed martial arts to make such an argument with a straight face?  I note again, while negotiating, Dana White emphatically declared that Fedor Emelianenko was the greatest heavyweight on the planet.  When Emelianenko refused to sign with Zuffa due to the onerous contracts, Fedor instantly fell out of the top five according to Mr. White.  A promoter’s ability to write fighters in and out of rankings arbitrarily serves to drastically reduce a fighter’s marketability and leverage, and also, in effect, keeps other fighters in line lest they receive the same treatment afforded to Matt Lindland.

 

3)    Inconsistent procedures.  Mr. Brookhouse again, in dismissing the Act’s call for consistent regulations across jurisdictions calls Zuffa a sports franchise.  Again, Zuffa is not a sports franchise.  It is, plain and simply, a promoter.  The author dismisses my earlier assertion by stating that so long as practices are legal in any given state, there is no need for regulations to be consistent amongst the states.  Mr. Brookhouse misses the entire thrust of the Act’s aims, namely, to prevent promotions from seeking jurisdictions with weak, or non-existent regulations.  The Act doesn’t seek to require all promotions to be uniform.  If state law is inconsistent, and some states provide minimal protections (indeed, Hawaii for a long period of time had mixed martial arts events with no commission) then federal law providing for minimal requirements offers protections to fighters they would not otherwise enjoy.  Mr. Brookhouse completely missed the point in his objection to the Act’s application to mixed martial arts.  This defect the Act seeks to address  has nothing to do with different promotions (or as he calls them, franchises) having different rules.  Indeed, if Mr. Brookhouse does not understand the basis for the Act’s application, can he really disagree with it?

 

 

4)    Hidden agreements.  Mr. Brookhouse seems to agree with this basis for the Act’s application to mixed martial arts.  His assumption that the hidden payments are the discretionary and reported fight bonuses, however, suggests again that he isn’t clear about what type of agreements the Act seeks to shed light upon.

 

5)    Options.  Mr. Brookhouse largely dismisses the prohibition in the Act against coercive options by suggesting that such clauses are the subject of rumor mill, and have not been confirmed to actually exist.  Mr. Brookhouse writes, “I suppose the rumored (I have never heard this actually confirmed) ‘auto-renewing contracts’ if a fighter is a champion in the UFC could fit to a degree.”  The so-called “Champion’s Clause” isn’t rumor, it is confirmed fact.  See Fedor Emelianenko’s comments regarding the contract offered to him in this article.  http://mmafa.tv.previewdns.com/blog/2008/07/why-the-muhammad-ali-act-should-apply-to-mma-update/.  Thus, it would appear Mr. Brookhouse actually agrees that the protections offered by the Act against coercive options is a beneficial thing.  Note, the prohibition against long-term promotional options doesn’t mean champions would automatically leave.  It simply prevents a promoter from locking up a fighter long-term (greater than 12-months) as a precondition to receiving the title fight.  Ironically, despite Mr. Brookhouse’s reasoning, this provision has caused champions to leave (Couture) or not sign in the first place (Emelianenko).

 

Mr. Brookhouse concludes by stating:  “I can not stress enough that the Ali Act was created for a sport with a completely different organizational structure than MMA.”  History has proven you wrong.  The history of Zuffa is one of regulation, fitting MMA into the Boxing regulations so the sport would not die.  Zuffa, in large part, is made up of former state boxing regulators.  Indeed, why would Zuffa hire Ratner (a boxing official) instead of league attorneys from one of the major sports if they are really just a “franchise” or “league?”  If this argument were as simple as Mr. Brookhouse suggests, Zuffa would not be paying lobbyists to fight application of the Act.

 

Know who carved the peg, before you cite that Korean proverb.

Eddie Goldman of NHBnews published an article on December 27, 2007, which contained detailed quotes from Fedor Emelianenko.  The article can be found here:  http://www.adcombat.com/Article.asp?Article_ID=14555.  Unfortunately, I didn’t see this article while drafting the initial blog, but it is worth referencing now.

 

In the article, Fedor Emelianenko detailed the reasons he chose not to sign with Zuffa.  Emelianenko stated:

 

“The contract that we were presented with by the UFC was simply impossible, couldn’t be signed–I couldn’t leave.  If I won, I had to fight up to eight times in two years.  If I lost one fight, then the UFC had the right to rip up the contract.  At the conclusion of the contract, if I am undefeated, then it automatically extends for an as yet unspecified time, though for the same compensation.”

 

Emelianenko continued:

 

“Basically, I can’t leave undefeated.  I can’t give interviews, appear in films or advertising.  I don’t have the right to do anything without the UFC’s agreement.  I could do nothing without the OK from the UFC.  I didn’t have the right to compete in combat sambo competition.  It’s my national sport.  It’s the Russian sport, which in his time our president competed in, and I no longer have the right to do so.  There were many such clauses; the contract was 18 pages in length.  It was written in such a way that I had absolutely no rights while the UFC could at any moment, if something didn’t suit them, tear up the agreement.  We worked with lawyers who told us it was patently impossible to sign   such   document.”  (http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles.asp?n_id=10538

 

Mr. Goldman observed that Randy Couture (the then current heavyweight champion of the UFC), Emelianenko, and Dana White himself went “on public record stating that UFC fighters are essentially required to sign contracts from which they ‘couldn’t leave’ or can’t or ‘don’t resign.’”

 

Mr. Goldman then concluded that:

 

“The time has come for both federal and state agencies in the U.S. to examine the legality of these UFC contracts.  Even if they are technically legal, they also must be compared to the federal requirements for boxing contracts mandated by the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, which was enacted in 2000.”

 

Additionally, on Mr. Goldman’s most recent “No Holds Barred” radio show, Nick Lembo, New Jersey State Athletic Control Board Deputy Attorney, declared that he believed the Muhammad Ali Act should be applied to mixed martial arts.  You can check this show out here:  http://nhbnews.blogspot.com/.

 

Finally, Matt “the Law” Lindland also spoke out, declaring:

 

“The UFC contracts are illegal.  Based on the Muhammad Ali (Safety) Act, you cannot be the promoter and the manager at the same time.  If they are telling you who and when you are going to fight, they are the manager as well as the promoter.”  http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2008/07/03/matt-lindland-claims-ufc-contracts-are-illegal/.

 

Lindland’s quote references the provision in the Act which prohibits certain conflicts of interest by establishing a “fire-wall” between managers and promoters.  15 § USCA 6308.

 

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00006308—-000-.html.

 

The original article entitled “Battle Lines Being Drawn:  Why the Muhammad Ali Act Should Apply to MMA” can be found here:

 

http://mmafa.tv.previewdns.com/blog/2008/07/battle-lines-being-drawn-why-the-muhammad-ali-act-should-apply-to-mma/.

Marketing Rights Agreement Highlights

Billion-Dollar UFC Enters Merchandising in Big Way:   Good Deal For Fighters?

 

On June 10, 2008, the UFC announced the introduction of UFC-branded “action-figures” which will hit retailers in time for Christmas 2009.  Live on cable-giant CNBC, Dana White publicly declared, “We just closed a deal with JAKKS and these are going to be available next Christmas,” as the camera zoomed in on action figures of Chuck Liddell and Brock Lesnar. ¹

 

Soon after the CNBC segment aired, the UFC announced on its website a flurry of other licensing and merchandising deals for products that will soon be available to consumers across the world.  Soon, you will be able to shop with your UFC-branded credit card at retailer JC Penney, who will be creating “UFC Hot Zones” in August that will sell shirts and headwear in the Young Men’s department. Silver Buffalo will introduce UFC-branded watches, barware, bar accessories, lighting, wall décor, and billiards and darts accessories.  You can even light your favorite cigarettes with UFC-branded Bic lighters!²

 

“There’s going to be incredible UFC-branded product,” said Randy Klein, the UFC’s Vice President of Licensing and Merchandising. “We’re establishing a benchmark of MMA product that no one has ever seen before. We’re going to be in retailers all over the world with our video game, apparel, and sports collectibles. It’s really an exciting time right now.”

 

“This puts our merchandise on a global scale.  The fans have been waiting for UFC product for years and now we’ve joined up with some of the biggest and best companies in the world to produce authentic UFC-licensed products.”

 

One wonders, what is in it for the fighters?  Also, is the product being moved because of the popularity of the athletes who actually compete, or the promotion that provides the stage of competition?  This is a question that Zuffa ambitiously attempts to obfuscate with the “smoke and mirrors” referred to by Dana White.³

 

As discussed below, Zuffa’s move into the licensing arena is coupled with an effort to obtain executed “Marketing Rights” agreements from the athletes, and to take, as always, the lion’s share of the profit.

 

I.  “Marketing Rights Agreement”

I have received, from multiple sources, a copy of the “Marketing Rights Agreement” (“Agreement”) that is being circulated by Zuffa to fighters for signature.  Multiple parties have asked me to review and provide my thoughts on this Agreement.  In short, my input has been requested to answer whether this Agreement is a good deal for fighters.  Instead of answering each person individually, I will post my thoughts here.

 

Upon reading the Agreement for the first time, my initial reaction is best described as shock.  The descriptions I received from managers, agents and others as to the nature of the Agreement did not always match the Agreement’s actual terms.  The Agreement, in short, is absurd for fighters, and drastically impacts their marketing and revenue producing ability throughout, and even after their athletic careers.

Essentially, Zuffa is seeking to obtain a license to use a fighter’s likeness rights in the development, distribution, marketing and sale of “Licensed Merchandise.”⁴ By executing the Agreement, a fighter grants Zuffa a license to utilize the “Identity”⁵ of such fighter in the sale, production and distribution of Licensed Merchandise.  The license to utilize the Identity of a fighter in connection with the sale of Licensed Merchandise is collectively defined in the Agreement as “Merchandise Rights.”⁶

 

In exchange for granting Zuffa the Merchandise Rights, a fighter is entitled to (i) ten percent (10%) of “Gross Revenue” “received by Zuffa in connection with the sale of Licensed Merchandise directly or indirectly by Zuffa,” and (ii) twenty percent (20%) of the “Gross Royalty Revenues” “received by Zuffa from third parties in connection with the commercial exploitation of Licensed Merchandise by such third parties.”

 

So, what is the problem?  Sounds great, right?  Zuffa is sharing with fighters the lucrative licensing rights it seeks to exploit.  As Dana White recently told Yahoo Sports, “with the merchandising and all the ancillary stuff, the fighters are going to be paid when they’re sitting on their couch.”  White continued:

 

As described below, the Agreement represents the proverbial wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing.

 

II.  The Marketing Rights Agreement Bares its Teeth

 

A.  The Agreement grants Zuffa an Exclusive License Prohibiting even the Sale of Autographed Photographs!

At least some managers and agents believe the Agreement grants Zuffa a “non-exclusive” license.  Thus, these managers are far more apt to overlook some of the problematic features of the Agreement, as they believe the fighter will be able to exploit their Identity elsewhere.  Admittedly, after my initial read-through, I came to the same conclusion.  The Agreement does not contain “exclusive” language in the logical sections of the Agreement that you would typically expect while reviewing a license agreement.

 

The forms of Agreement I have seen, however, each contain the following provision (bolded for emphasis):

 

If the Merchandise Rights are Zuffa’s sole property, they can belong to no one else, and are indeed exclusive.  Zuffa holds the Merchandise Rights “free and clear of all claims” of the fighter, or anyone claiming rights through the fighter.

 

Likewise, the Agreement operates to strip even the fighter himself of the opportunity to exploit his own Identity in the marketplace.  As discussed above, the Merchandise Rights granted to Zuffa apply to Licensed Merchandise, which includes “without limitation, all apparel, footwear, hats, photographs, souvenirs, toys, collectibles, trading cards, and any and all other similar type products.”

 

If Merchandise Rights are Zuffa’s sole property, a fighter would be prohibited from selling such items as t-shirts, autographed photographs, souvenirs, and other collectibles bearing the fighter’s own Identity!  Likewise, if a fighter becomes a star, and is approached by a shoe manufacture or an apparel company to create a signature-product bearing the fighter’s Identity, Zuffa is entitled to (i) prohibit such product from being produced as the sole owner of the Merchandise Rights, and/or (ii) demand compensation in the form of 80% of the royalties that would have been received by the fighter.

 

Tellingly, Dana White informed Rolling Stone Magazine that fighters are “dumb motherf—ers,” and the licensed products featuring the Identity of a single fighter are not selling because of that fighter’s Identity, but instead, because of the UFC brand.  Thus, even with products sold displaying the Identity of a single fighter, Zuffa is entitled, by this Agreement, to eighty or ninety percent (80%-90%) of the profits that would have been earmarked to the fighter individually.

B.  The Term of the Agreement Lasts Forever.

The Merchandise Rights granted to Zuffa in the Agreement are worldwide, “in perpetuity,” which means, the Merchandise Rights granted to Zuffa endure forever.  Not only are fighters being asked to sign an agreement that grants likeness rights to Zuffa on a worldwide, exclusive basis (to the exclusion, incredibly, of even the fighter himself), the term of the Agreement is, in theory, forever.  The Agreement, as stated above, explicitly provides that the Merchandise Rights are Zuffa’s “sole property in perpetuity. . .”

 

Curiously, the Agreement contains a later section that sets forth the term of the Agreement.  Initially, the term of the Agreement is for a period of three (3) years.  The term, however, automatically renews for additional three (3) year periods until such time as Zuffa alone elects to terminate the Agreement.  Thus, it appears as though this section is provided for the sole reason of allowing Zuffa to terminate the Agreement to avoid future payments to a fighter.

C.  The Marketing Rights for Fighter are Held by Zuffa Even After a Fighter is Cut!

The Agreement contains the following provision, which enables Zuffa to retain all Marketing Rights, even after a fighter’s promotional contract is terminated and the fighter is cut:

 

This provision is most disturbing, and serves to incredibly hamper a fighter’s ability to capitalize off his Identity throughout his career.  Likewise, this provision is especially damaging as it will hinder the efforts of both fighters and competing promotions alike going forward.

 

The vast majority of fighters will fight in multiple promotions during the course of their careers.  Even those who graduate from local shows to the UFC, and remain with the UFC for an entire career, will most likely reach a period of time when they are available to bidding promotions.  By entering this period of “free agency” or “limited free agency” (in the event Zuffa has a chance to match competing offers), the fighter is, in theory, enabled to maximize earning potential by offering his services up to bid.

 

The inclusion of this clause not only hurts the earning capacity of the fighter directly by drastically curtailing his ability to capitalize on his Identity, but indirectly serves to greatly reduce the marketing ability and competitive standing of those competing promotions that may bid for a fighter in the future.

 

The impact of this provision should not be ignored, nor underappreciated.  If competing promotions and fighters alike are not able to capitalize on the Identity of the fighter in the building of other brands (including the individual brand of the fighter himself), the “open” market which serves to drive fighter earning capacity higher is drastically compromised.

D.  The Agreement Requires Fighter to Make up to Six (6) Appearances Per Year.

As a lawyer, the notion that “time is money” is ingrained upon us from our stints as summer associates.  Our most valuable commodity that we have to offer anyone, be it our employer, our clients, our friends or loved ones, is our time.  That said, the Agreement contains a provision which requires the fighter to make up to six (6) scheduled appearances to “assist in the advertising, publicity, and promotion of the sale of Licensed Merchandise that includes Fighter’s Identity. . .”

 

The catch, each of the appearances may be required of the fighter for no additional compensation.  This hardly seems reasonable, especially in light of the fact that the fighter is only receiving ten percent (10%) of the revenue generated by the sale by Zuffa of Licensed Merchandise, and only twenty percent (20%) of the sale of Licensed Merchandise by third parties.⁸

E.  The Agreement contains no Audit Provisions.

Typically, in a contract that contains a provision that ties compensation to revenues received in the future, the party to whom compensation is due will obtain “audit” rights to verify that the payment it actually receives is in accordance with the contractual terms.  For example, you may recall, in the Randy Couture situation involving Zuffa, Couture had “audit” rights to verify Zuffa’s pay per view figures.  Couture’s total compensation was tied to the pay-per-view performance of the events he participated in.

 

This Agreement, however, does not provide any such “audit” rights to the fighter.  This Agreement requires only that Zuffa provide fighter “with a statement of royalties earned by Fighter hereunder during the previous calendar year. . .”  Thus, a fighter has no contractual means to actually verify that the royalties he receives are in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

 

F.  The Agreement enables Zuffa to divert Royalty and Licensing Payments.

 

The Agreement contains a seemingly innocuous provision that provides as follows:

 

Lawyers are typically wordy, admittedly, but provisions are not included in contracts without reason.  Why, then, is this clause inserted into the Agreement?  Simply, this provision enables Zuffa to shift income that could be classified as a license or royalty fee entitling a fighter to payment, into a payment that is Zuffa’s income alone. How is this possible?  Instead of negotiating for the highest royalty or license fee possible, Zuffa is now contractually enticed to negotiate bifurcated deals involving separate “marketing” agreements, “consulting” agreements, or “third-party” service agreements.  Any revenue obtained by Zuffa pursuant to any such agreements would go to Zuffa alone.

 

G.  The Agreement Requires a Fighter to Warrant that all Permissions Have Been Obtained to Utilize Third Party Marks and Copyrights.

The Agreement contains a provision where the fighter represents and warrants to Zuffa that all permissions have been obtained from third parties for the utilization of all trademarks, copyrights, phrases, expressions, and the like.  Is the fighter prepared to make such a representation and warranty?  Have all permissions been obtained from any and all sponsors?  Isn’t Zuffa in better position to obtain the requisite permissions in the first place?

 

Imagine a scenario in the future where a clothing company or other sponsor falls out of favor with Zuffa, and demands that all products featuring its trademarks be pulled off the shelves.  This Agreement enables Zuffa to recover all damages incurred as a result of such action from the fighter in the event requisite permissions are not obtained in advance.

 

H.  The Agreement does not offer any Royalty or License Payments for Video Games and DVDs.

The DVD market is extremely lucrative.  UFC DVD’s are typically amongst the best selling sports-related DVDs on the market.  The UFC video-game being developed by THQ will likely sell millions of copies, and provides another extremely lucrative licensing fee for Zuffa.  Unfortunately for fighters, the Agreement contains a provision excluding video games, DVDs, and the like from the scope of the Agreement.⁹ Thus, no royalty or licensing fees are payable for such products pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

 

I.  The Agreement Prohibits a Fighter from Not Only Using Licensed Marks of Zuffa, but Also Mere Words Alone!

The Agreement contains a provision which prohibits a fighter from utilizing not only any of the Licensed Marks of Zuffa, including the marks of the “Ultimate Fighting Championship®, UFC®, the Octagon™, Ultimate Fighting®, Ultimate Fighter®, Pride Fighting Championships®, Pride®, and any logos, pictures or other representations of ZUFFA’s intellectual property”, but also prohibits a fighter from using the mere words alone!

 

This is an incredible contractual term that not only prevents a fighter from using the Marks owned by Zuffa, but from also merely using words representing nothing more than undisputed, and public factual occurrences.  Georges St. Pierre, for example, by the terms of this Agreement, would be prohibited from marketing himself using facts alone.  A statement such as “Georges St. Pierre, UFC Fighter” would violate the terms of this Agreement, unless prior permission was obtained from Zuffa.

 

It is beyond comprehension that such a term would appear in an athlete contract in another sport.  Could you imagine a contract that prohibited Emmitt Smith from mentioning, for marketing purposes, the fact that he is a former All-Pro running back of the Dallas Cowboys?  This provision, in my opinion, would be unenforceable under applicable intellectual property laws, but the Agreement grants Zuffa a contractual hook in which to threaten and institute litigation.  Lawyers are expensive, and lawsuits are lengthy, time consuming propositions.  The effect of such a clause severely inhibits and chills a fighter’s ability to use nothing more than factual occurrences for marketing purposes.

J.  The Indemnity Required of Fighter is Fraught with Danger.

The Agreement requires a fighter to indemnify and hold harmless “Zuffa, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, and each of their members, managers, directors, officers, employees, representatives, agents and contractors” from and against any and all claims, damages or expenses that Zuffa might incur “arising from or relating to any negligent or intentional acts or omissions” by fighter or anyone affiliated with fighter.

 

Anyone affiliated with fighter?  Whom does that include exactly?  “Affiliated with fighter” isn’t defined in the Agreement, though note the list of indemnified parties is spelled out with specificity.  This provision is fraught with danger, and provides a powerful tool to Zuffa to utilize against a fighter in the future.

 

III.  Brand

This entry provides my thoughts on the Marketing Rights Agreement currently being circulated by Zuffa to fighters for signature.  In short, I urge you not to sign this Agreement.  By doing so, you drastically minimize your earnings capacity going forward.

 

In the next installment, I will discuss the power and importance of brands, and how a “brand” could be effectively utilized by fighters to not only enhance their marketing power, but also to provide a far greater share (nearly all) of the licensing revenue that is generated by the likeness rights of the athletes who actually compete.

 

To preview, the percentage share of gross revenue players’ receive in other major sports is 59% in the NFL, 57% in the NBA, 55.6% in the NHL, and 53% in MLB.  In mixed martial arts, because no centralized league exists, fighters could take even higher percentages of licensing revenue.  As will be discussed, fighters need only adopt a uniform brand of their own, and assign group licensing rights to an association they own and control to realize the lion’s share of the ancillary revenue Zuffa seeks to retain for itself.

 

I will close for now with the following thought.  Imagine a video game branded with the UFC marks, but without the likeness or identity of any recognizable fighters.  Imagine, again, a second video game offering, with no promotional marks whatsoever, but featuring the brand adopted by the athletes themselves and containing the identities of all of today’s recognizable stars, including Gina Carano, Big John McCarthy, Randy Couture, Quinton Jackson, Chuck Liddell, Fedor Emelianenko, Sakuraba, and the like.  Which game would appeal more to the general public?

 

Don’t let the wolf pull the wool over your eyes.

 

Rob Maysey graduated from Cornell Law School, is licensed to practice in Arizona, California, and Minnesota, and is currently practicing law in Phoenix, Arizona.

Rob can be reached here.

*Blog was edited to clarify definitions of Gross Revenue and Gross Royalty Revenues.

 

ENDNOTES

1.  Gerbasi, Thomas. “UFC Gets Major Boost with Industry-Shaking Merchandise Deals,” Yahoo Sports, June 18, 2008. http://www.ufc.com/index.cfm?fa=news.detail&gid=12696.

2. Pishna, Ken. “UFC Makes Major Deals, Debunks Rumors on CNBC,” mmaweekly.com, June 10, 2008. http://www.mmaweekly.com/absolutenm/templates/dailynews.asp?articleid=6457&zoneid=13.

3. Dana White’s comment in full, provided to Rolling Stone Magazine, was:

“See, this is the one part of the business I f—ing hate.  Everybody wants more money, they want it now.  And then all these fighters are like, ‘We’re the superstars, not the UFC!  It should all be about us.’  You dumb motherf—ers.  You don’t know what your f—ing with.  I’m a promoter, and a lot of this s— is built with smoke and mirrors.”  Heedgaard, Erik.  “What the F**k Is Dana White Fighting For?”  Rolling Stone Magazine, June 12, 2008.

4. “Licensed Merchandise” is defined in the Agreement as “without limitation, all apparel, footwear, hats, photographs, souvenirs, toys, collectibles, trading cards, and any and all other similar type products, including the sleeves, jackets and packaging for such products. . .”

5. “Identity” is defined in the Agreement as “the name, sobriquet, voice, persona, signature, likeness and/or biographical of Fighter solely in connection with the development, manufacture, distribution, marketing and sale of Licensed Merchandise.”

6.  “Merchandise Rights” are defined in the Agreement as the “unrestricted worldwide right to use, edit, disseminate, display, reproduce, print, publish and make any other uses of the” Identity of fighter “in connection with the development, manufacture, distribution, marketing and sale of Licensed Merchandise.”

7.  Iole, Kevin.  “Y! exclusive:  Fertitta shifts from casinos to cage,” Yahoo Sports, June 18, 2008.  http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news;_ylt=Ah8NkDylLm6.uKjADFC09oU9Eo14?slug=ki-ufcplans061708&prov=yhoo&type=lgns.

8.  As stated above, in the event the Identity of multiple fighters is utilized in the sale of any product, the fighters share is split with all such fighters included in the product offering.

9.  The Agreement excludes from its coverage, among other things, all “video games or other interactive devices, home video and computer games, arcade video games, hand held versions of video games, video slot machines, CDROMS, DVDs, Internet applications, wireless, video and audio cassettes and discs developed. . .”

Zuffa, LLC’s (”Zuffa“)¹ efforts in opening new jurisdictions for, and regulating the sport of mixed martial arts (”MMA“) are laudable.  MMA is now sanctioned in 32 states, and it is safe to say that is largely due to the efforts of Zuffa.  Currently, Zuffa is ambitiously attempting to gain approval for mixed martial arts in the State of New York.

 

Zuffa’s efforts have extended to lobbying members of Congress.  Recently, it was reported that Zuffa retained the Washington D.C. firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck (”Brownstein“) to lobby members of Congress.  Reportedly, Brownstein’s mission is predominantly educational to advise members of Congress how far the UFC has evolved since its inception.  Makan Delrahim, a former top Justice Department official who is now a lobbyist at Brownstein stated:

 

“UFC is at the point where they are one of the fastest-growing sports leagues, and we want to make sure members of Congress are aware of the changes MMA has undergone.”²

 

Brownstein, however, is also lobbying members of Congress in regards to the Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2007, introduced by Senator John McCain last year.³ Zuffa’s efforts are targeted towards avoiding being placed under the auspices of the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act of 2000 (the “Muhammad Ali Act” or “Act“) and the Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2007, which supplements and adds to the Muhammad Ali Act.

 

The Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2007 seeks to create a federal U.S. Boxing Commission to oversee the sport, protect the safety of boxers, and regulate contracts between boxers and promoters.  As Delrahim stated:

 

“Sometimes those types of laws can become vehicles for other things, affecting other sports.  Boxing has a whole different story and certain laws may have been appropriate, but it is a whole different operation for MMA; it wouldn’t make sense to apply the same rules.”⁴

 

Is it really a “whole different story?”  Should the Muhammad Ali Act apply to MMA?  In May of 2008, even Marc Ratner, the Vice President of Regulatory Affairs for Zuffa stated that there “is absolutely no reason that the sport should not be regulated along with the sport of boxing.”⁵

 

Does this matter to mixed martial artists, and should they care?  In short, the answer is yes.  The activity undertaken by Zuffa “to do everything they possibly can to not be listed under the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act of 2000″ is directly hostile to the interests of mixed martial artists, and the stakes are enormous.⁶

 

This article primarily focuses on the Muhammad Ali Act, which contains the majority of the substantive legal protections for boxers.  The proposed Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2007 supplements and adds enforcement mechanisms to the Muhammad Ali Act.

 

I.  Summary of Federal Boxing Law.

 

In 1996, the Professional Boxing Safety Act (the “PBSA“) was signed into law.  The PBSA was a Congressional measure that established minimum requirements to protect the health and safety of boxers.⁷ The PBSA also sought to address the lack of public oversight of boxing.  The PBSA, among other things, (i) requires State athletic commissions to oversee all professional boxing events; (ii) prohibits medically-suspended fighters from participating in boxing matches; (iii) assures that States are aware that a fighter may be suspended in another State; (iv) requires adequate medical services to be available at ringside; and (v) requires all boxers to be given an identification card issued by their State commission.⁸

 

Congress, however, sought further reform of the boxing industry.  In May of 2000, the Muhammad Ali Act was signed into law.  In short, the Muhammad Ali Act protects the rights and welfare of professional boxers by preventing exploitive, oppressive, and unethical business practices and promotes honorable competition to enhance the overall integrity of the boxing industry.

 

II.  The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act of 2000.

 

Why was the Muhammad Ali Act enacted in the first place?  What practices were occurring in boxing that required Congressional involvement?  A look at the legislative history of the Muhammad Ali Act details the abuses which prompted Congressional action, and passage of the Act.  Indeed, the Congressional findings were inserted directly into the Act itself.  As will be seen below, the Congressional findings made in relation to boxing apply almost wholesale to the current status of MMA today.  The only ingredient missing is decades of abuse.

 

In the Senate Report drafted in support of the Muhammad Ali Act, the Committee stated that the Muhammad Ali Act “seeks to remedy many of the anti-competitive, oppressive, and unethical business practices which have cheated professional boxers and denied the public the benefits of a truly honest and legitimate sport.”⁹ The Act “is designed to prohibit the harmful and arbitrary business practices which have clearly hurt the welfare of professional boxers. . .”¹⁰

 

In a later Senate Committee Report, the Committee reported the purpose of the Act “is to protect professional boxers from coercive and exploitative business practices, reduce interstate restraints of trade, assist state boxing officials to provide proper oversight of the sport, and increase honest competition and the integrity of the industry.”¹¹ The Senate Committee noted that the sport of boxing “has no league, governing body, or private sector association of industry leaders to establish fair business practices and discipline improper and arbitrary conduct.”¹² Finally, the Committee specifically “emphasizes the vulnerability and lack of leverage most professional boxers have with respect to various arbitrary business practices of these entities in the sport.”¹³

 

What actions constituted “exploitative business practices,” and what is meant by increasing “honest competition and the integrity of industry?”  The Senate Committee Report details each of these items:

 

1. long-term promotional contracts and options hurt the boxer and the sport;
2. organizations do not have credible ratings procedures;
3. organizations have inconsistent procedures, and state regulations do not adequately regulate promoter contracts;
4. difficulty for state commisssions to individually monitor promoter-boxer contracts, and necessity of a federal mechanism to prevent hidden agreements; and
5. promoters forcing boxers to give options in return for getting a title fight.

 

Each of the defects noted above applies in full to the current status of mixed martial artists.

 

III.  Supporters of the Muhammad Ali Act.

 

Support for the passage of the Act was widespread, including a list of giants involved with the boxing industry.  Frederic G. Levin, current WAMMA Executive Legal Counsel, and counsel for Roy Jones Jr., testified that long term promotional contracts and options hurt the boxer and the sport and that no credible rankings procedures exist.  Mr. Levin recommended that all options and promotional rights gained from a boxer seeking to compete in a particular fight be prohibited.¹⁴ Roy Jones Jr. also submitted written testimony calling for “options” in boxer contracts to be prohibited.

 

Likewise, attorney Patrick C. English, who has represented promoters and boxers in the sport, testified that state regulations do not adequately regulate promoter contracts.  Famed boxing manager Mr. Shelly Finkel, a manager of several world champions, submitted testimony stating that the bill would help end the exploitation of boxers.  Former commissioner Larry Hazzard of New Jersey testified that the Act would help the New Jersey State Board of Athletic Control protect boxers from coercive and unfair business practices.¹⁵

 

Marc Ratner, currently Vice President of Regulatory Affairs for Zuffa, testified that it is difficult for state commissions to individually monitor promoter-boxer contracts, and that a federal mechanism should be put in place to prevent hidden agreements.¹⁶ Ratner also said “I am a states rights activist and I didn’t want any federal bill that would take away our state rights to regulate fights,” adding that he hoped McCain and Reid, at the very least, would be persuaded to model any federal commission after Nevada’s body.”¹⁷ Legendary trainer Eddie Futch testified that the Act is a necessary and positive reform for professional boxing.  Nevada Judge and long-time referee Mills Lane of “Let’s Get it On” fame criticized the practice of promoters forcing boxers to give options in return for getting a title fight.¹⁸ Nineteen U.S. State Attorneys General signed a letter in support of the Act, and forwarded it to the Committee stating “this legislation will curb anti-competitive and fraudulent business practices and prevent blatant exploitation of professional boxers.”¹⁹ A copy of the letter can be read here.

 

The boxing media also almost uniformly supported the passage of the Act.  The International Boxing Digest wrote that “we support the new [boxing] bill, and urge all honest people in professional boxing to do likewise. Fighters need to be protected, and not simply from what happens in the ring. This bill does it like it’s never done before.” Ring Magazine declared, “imagine a world in which fighters are not taken advantage of financially, title shots are awarded to legitimate contenders. .  . If the Ali Act passes . . . that boxing heaven may just be located right here on earth.”²⁰

 

Most notably, former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali appeared and had his statement read by an associate.  Ali stated that professional boxing had become a travesty and that something must be done to stop the manipulation of boxers, including the lack of credible rankings.²¹ A copy of each of the letters Muhammad Ali submitted in support of the Act can be read here and here.

 

Sponsors in support of the Act declared:

 

“We have received strong praise for this legislation from every sector of the industry and, most importantly, from boxers themselves. It is to be expected that certain vested interests in professional boxing industry will not welcome any reforms of anti-competitive and confiscatory business practices in the sport. However, the Ali Act will clearly improve the sport in the public interest, and will not inhibit any legitimate business practices. If enacted, the professional boxing industry will not only be free of certain types of abusive and unethical business practices, but competition should surely increase. Competition is the heart of any sport, and fair, open competition is the key to a sport’s success.”²²

 

IV.  Arguments in Favor of Applying the Muhammad Ali Act to MMA.

 

Congress, in enacting the Act, set forth its findings directly in the body of the Act, as set forth below.  Below are each the congressional findings made in regards to the boxing industry, and then arguments for applying the Ali Act to MMA.  As seen below, the congressional findings apply almost without modification to MMA.  Simply replace “boxer” with “mixed martial artist,” and “boxing” with “mixed martial arts.”  My comments are interspersed in italics after each of the Congressional findings.

 

“The Congress makes the following findings:²³

 

(1) Professional boxing differs from other major, interstate professional sports industries in the United States in that it operates without any private sector association, league, or centralized industry organization to establish uniform and appropriate business practices and ethical standards.  This has led to repeated occurrences of disreputable and coercive business practices in the boxing industry, to the detriment of professional boxers nationwide.

 

This finding applies in whole to the current status of mixed martial arts.  Currently, no such centralized industry organization or governing body exists.  Indeed, the UFC, by virtue of sheer market dominance, in large part dictates business practices.  Arguably the promotional agreements now being litigated/arbitrated by Couture and Zuffa are an example of the coercive practices the Act seeks to prohibit.

(2) State officials are the proper regulators of professional boxing events, and must protect the welfare of professional boxers and serve the public interest by closely supervising boxing activity in their jurisdiction. State athletic commissions do not currently receive adequate information to determine whether boxers competing in their jurisdiction are being subjected to contract terms and business practices which may violate State regulations, or are onerous and confiscatory.

 

Likewise, this finding also applies in whole to the current status of mixed martial arts.  The Commissioner of a major state athletic commission told me personally that many of the contracts he has reviewed upon request would be unenforceable under state law due to lack of “mutuality of obligation” (among other defects he has personally seen).  Additionally, the same commissions regulate both MMA and boxing, so the Act should apply to both sports.  Furthermore, because MMA is a new sport, recently introduced to these commissions and they are not nearly as equipped to regulate the sport of MMA.  Finally, the promotional agreements in MMA are typically confidential, so of course they are ill informed.

(3) Promoters who engage in illegal, coercive, or unethical business practices can take advantage of the lack of equitable business standards in the sport by holding boxing events in States with weaker regulatory oversight.

 

Zuffa deserves applause for its efforts in attempting to gain uniformity, and safety for the sport of mixed martial arts.  That said, this finding may still be applicable to other promotions, particularly due to the lack of uniformity among the states in regulations.  This lack of uniformity enables promoters to “forum-shop,” selecting states with weaker regulations and thus, increasing the health and exploitation risks faced by the athletes.

(4) The sanctioning organizations which have proliferated in the boxing industry have not established credible and objective criteria to rate professional boxers, and operate with virtually no industry or public oversight.  Their ratings are susceptible to manipulation, have deprived boxers of fair opportunities for advancement, and have undermined public confidence in the integrity of the sport.

 

No credible or objective rankings criteria have been adopted by any promotion.  Title shots are not granted upon merit at all, in many instances.  Title fights that virtually all serious mixed martial arts fans and media members alike declare as necessary, such as Randy Couture v. Fedor Emelianenko don’t occur, in part, because of the refusal to grant Zuffa future promotional options.  Indeed, the “titles” themselves are entirely exclusive to a particular promotion.

 

(5) Open competition in the professional boxing industry has been significantly interfered with by restrictive and anticompetitive business practices of certain promoters and sanctioning bodies, to the detriment of the athletes and the ticket-buying public.  Common practices of promoters and sanctioning organizations represent restraints of interstate trade in the United States.

 

Again, this finding applies in whole, without modification to the sport of mixed martial arts.  Fights that the public wants to see do not occur because of the refusal of some fighters to enter into long-term promotional agreements, and the refusal of certain promoters to co-promote.  “Rankings” and “contender” status are largely pure manipulations by the promoters, and often not the result of merit at all.  Most promotions have exclusive promotional agreements.  All major promotions keep their champions under exclusivity.

(6) It is necessary and appropriate to establish national contracting reforms to protect professional boxers and prevent exploitive business practices, and to require enhanced financial disclosures to State athletic commissions to improve the public oversight of the sport.”

 

Likewise, this finding applies in whole to the sport of mixed martial arts, without modification.  The abuses noted by Congress as applicable to boxing also occur in the sport of mixed martial arts, to the detriment of the athletes that actually compete.

V.  The Muhammad Ali Act in Operation.

 

A.  Objective Rankings Criteria

The Muhammad Ali Act addresses the exploitive business practices faced by professional boxers by requiring objective and consistent rankings criteria for boxers.²⁴ This provision was inserted into the Ali Act to prevent promoters from abusing boxers and monopolizing the sport by requiring boxers to sign away all their rights in order to obtain an important fight or maintain their current status in the rankings.²⁵ In short, the Act attempts to prevent promoters from forcing boxers into coercive contracts as a condition of participating in a given match.

 

The Act seeks to prohibit promoters from being “able to rig the sport by placing favored boxers who have signed away promotional rights in the top rankings”, and for those boxers who refuse to cooperate, from being “arbitrarily dropped from the ranking or prevented from moving up.”  The Act requires rankings to be based on merit, not contractual subservience.  Standardized, objective rankings serve to increase public confidence in the sport, and means “new opportunities for honest boxers who are trying to fight their way up the rankings.”  Additionally, the sport achieves “more integrity and respect” since boxing fans “will know that championship matches are being fought by true champions.”²⁶

 

This protection alone is of enormous benefit for all mixed martial artists.  Currently, no objective rankings are utilized by any of the major promotions.  Title shots should be awarded by merit, and not based upon contracted promotional exclusivity.  Fighters and fans alike would benefit, as the best fighters would contend for titles, and fighters currently on the outside such as Matt Lindland, Josh Barnett, and Fedor Emelianenko would be in the public eye.  Market value of these fighters would increase, as the public would demand to see the best matchups available, regardless of a fighter’s contracted promotion.  The practice of putting fighters into “dark” matches on the undercard would also be noticed by the general public, and would likely occur with far less frequency if the Ali Act governed mixed martial arts.  The requirement of objective and consistent rankings afforded by the Muhammad Ali Act also ties into the protections against coercive contracts discussed below.

 

B.  Protection from Coercive and Exploitive Contracts-the Promotional Option.

 

The Muhammad Ali Act contains a section protecting fighters from “coercive contracts.”  The Act seeks to curb several of the most restrictive, onerous, and anti-competitive contracting practices which promoters have imposed on professional boxers.  Specifically, the Act greatly curtails the practice of requiring promotional “options,” which is the practice of contractually requiring an “exclusive long term promotional contract with a boxing challenger as a condition precedent to permitting a bout against another boxer that the promoter has under contract.”²⁷ This practice of requiring “options” stifles competition.  As the legislative history of the Act declares, the “athletes would be better served, as would open competition in the sport, if boxers were free to contract with those promoters they personally choose, rather than being coerced to contract with a promoter who is in the position of barring a lucrative bout.”²⁸ Such is the principle of most laws governing employment and personal services contracts.

 

Indeed, it appears as though the Couture-Emelianenko bout did not occur because of Zuffa’s insistence upon obtaining promotional options.  As reported by multiple sources, Zuffa’s offer to Fedor Emelianenko was apparently the most lucrative.  Emelianenko, however, objected to the onerous requirements of the Zuffa promotional contract being offered and refused to sign with Zuffa.²⁹ As a result, according to Dana White, Emelianenko went from “the number one Heavy Weight on the planet” to “Fedor sucks! He’s not even a top 5 Heavyweight.”  Likewise, with Matt Lindland, who at one point was the logical contender for a title match, only to be later dropped entirely from the division.

 

 

The Ali Act Makes Matches Like Couture-Emelianenko More Likely
and Increases a Fighter’s Leverage to Obtain Higher Purses

Additionally, Randy Couture’s contract reportedly contains a so-called “Champion’s Clause,” which serves to extend the term of the Zuffa promotional agreement in the event a fighter is a champion in a weight-class at the end of the contractual term.  The clause provides that “if, at the expiration of the Term, Fighter is then UFC champion, the Term shall be automatically extended for a period commencing on the Termination Date and ending on the earlier of (i) one (1) year from the Termination Date; or (ii) the date on which Fighter has participated in three (3) bouts promoted by ZUFFA following the Termination Date (”Extension Term”). Any references to the Term herein shall be deemed to include a reference to the Extension Term, where applicable.”³⁰ This clause serves to not only prevent a fighter from fighting outside the promotion, but also restricts his ability to negotiate for higher pay after securing a title.  This provision, under the Ali Act, and possibly the contract in whole would be deemed void if the Ali Act governed mixed martial arts.³¹

 

In fact, Mark Cuban of HDNet declared publicly he believes the Act already applies to mixed martial arts.  Cuban stated:

 

“Congress wanted to protect fighters. There is enough ambiguity in some definitions in the Act, that it could easily be applied. Which means it comes down to how the appropriate politicians feel that the Act can be applied to the benefit of their constituents. Meaning fighters and fans of MMA.”

 

Cuban continued by stating that it “won’t be hard to demonstrate how MMA fighters have been taken advantage of, particularly with contracts and how they are enforced, and to encourage action.”³²

 

Despite the fact that the athletes themselves have earned the right, through their performance, to fight the best in their respective weight classes, major promoters in mixed martial arts almost uniformly require exclusive promotional agreements from any fighter fighting for a title.  As one witness testified before the Senate, “this is akin to forcing a professional tennis player or golfer to sign an exclusive, long term contract with the promoter of whatever event they were seeking to win.  The athlete would then only be able to compete when the promoter approved, against only those opponents who also were forced to agree to terms with that promoter.”³³ In other sports this would be challenged as an unreasonable restraint on trade, in mixed martial arts, however, its business as usual.³⁴

 

The Act addresses these so-called “option” contracts by installing “a time limit of one year on all promotional rights that a promoter secures” from a fighter or another promotion “as a prerequisite to the boxer participating in a particular bout.”³⁵ Thus, if a promoter owns the rights to a champion, and a second fighter wants to fight the champion, then the champion’s promoter can acquire the rights to the second fighter, but only for up to 12 months.  Congress believed that the one year limitation will at least provide a fighter with the right to seek the highest bidder after one year, or provide them the option to simply select the promoter of their choosing.

 

C.  Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest.

 

The Act also contains a provision which prohibits certain conflicts of interest.  Specifically, the Act prohibits a manager from having a direct or indirect financial interest in a promotion.³⁶ It “is not plausible for a boxer to receive proper representation and counsel from a manager if the manager is also on the payroll of a promoter.  This is an obvious conflict of interest which works to the detriment of the boxer and the advantage of the promoter.”³⁷ The “fire-wall” between promoting and managing, however, only apply to boxers that are engaging in fights of 10 rounds or more, as many boxers that fight fewer rounds cannot afford to have separate managers and promoters.  These firewalls also do not apply where a boxer chooses to act as his or her own promoter or manager.

 

D.  Required Disclosures to State Athletic Commissions.

 

The Act also requires promoters to disclose all payments made to a fighter, whether by written or oral agreement.  Specifically, the Act requires the promoter to provide (i) a copy of any agreement in writing to which the promoter and fighter are a party, and (ii) to provide a written statement under penalty of perjury that no other written or oral agreements exist between the promotion and fighter.  No hidden agreements are permissible.³⁸ If a State law governing a boxing commission requires that information that would be furnished by a promoter under the Act shall be made public, then a promoter is not required to file such information with such State if the promoter files such information with the Association of Boxing Commissions.³⁹

 

The purpose of this provision is again, to protect fighters from exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous promoters.

 

E.  Minimal Standards for Bout, Promotional and Management Agreements.

 

The Act also required the Association of Boxing Commissions to develop and promulgate “guidelines for minimum contractual provisions that should be included in bout agreements and boxing contracts.”⁴⁰ Minimal standards and protections included within standardized bout, management, and promotional agreements for mixed martial artists would serve to benefit fighters for no other reason than greater consistency and uniformity from promotion to promotion.

 

VI.  Application of the Muhammad Ali Act to Mixed Martial Arts Would Greatly Benefit the Athletes Who Compete.

 

The Muhammad Ali Act seeks to prevent exploitation of fighters, and to prohibit coercive contractual provisions from being employed against fighters.  The Act also seeks to restore and maintain the integrity of the sport by requiring the employment of objective rankings criteria, so fighters advance in their careers on the basis of merit, and not subservience.  Lobbying efforts aimed at preventing the Act’s application to the sport of mixed martial arts are directly hostile to the interests of mixed martial artists.

 

The outspoken Bernard Hopkins, in testifying before the Senate, declared:

 

“While I am thankful for all that the fans have given me, I can not keep quiet when I see that things are not right. My stature has given me the opportunity to buck the system. I have been an outspoken advocate for change. I have rejected multi-million dollar paydays because the terms of the agreements presented to me were not fair. I have this luxury because I have food in my refrigerator and money invested in mutual funds. Other boxers cannot do this. They often are forced to borrow money to feed their families between bouts. It is for them that I have come to testify and hopefully you will keep them in mind when you go back to your offices to consider this legislation. The Muhammad Ali act was a great START.”⁴¹

 

Hopkins continued, stating he would support all efforts of Congress in supporting fighters, and in thanking influential media members for speaking out in support of the athletes who make the sport:

 

“Any time you need me, feel free. I am at your call. I am here to help, as a fighter I am here to help. . . Thanks for having me here, and I hope everyone like Tom Hauser and Bert Sugar, they have a lot of influence on boxing, too, they write about it. People listen to them. Believe it or not, people listen to them, and I am glad they are here saying things I agree with, and they agree with me, so thank you all for having me here.”⁴²

 

Bernard Hopkins is courageous.  Follow Mr. Hopkins lead, and speak out.

 

Rob Maysey graduated from Cornell Law School, is licensed to practice in Arizona, California, and Minnesota, and is currently practicing law in Phoenix, Arizona.

 

---

[1] Zuffa operates under and owns the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) trademark.

[2] Chi Ha, Kim. “Ultimate Fighting Hires Lobbying Firm,” thehill.com, May 27, 2008.  http://thehill.com/business–lobby/ultimate-fighting-hires-lobbying-firm-2008-05-27.html.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S.84, 110TH Congress 1st Session Report 2007 110-28 Calendar No. 65, Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2007.

[8] Id.

[9] Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, Senate, June 26, 1998, GPO P. S7257.

[10] Id.

[11] Senate Report 106-083, Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S.305, June 21, 1999.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] “Responding to Media Matters, AP continued to mislead in reporting on Reid,” June 1, 2006.  http://mediamatters.org/items/200606010009.

[18] Id.

[19] Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act (Extension of Remarks-May 24, 2000), Speech of Hon. Tom Bliley of Virginia in the House of Representatives, Monday, May 22, 2000.  [Page: E828]

[20] Id.

[21] See note 11 above.

[22] Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, Senate, January 25, 1999.  P. S979.

[23] 15 USCA § 6301.

[24] 15 USCA § 6307(c).

[25] Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, House of Representatives, May 22, 2000, Comments of Hon. Michael Oxley.  [Page: H3489]

[26] Id.

[27] See Note 11 above.

[28] Id.

[29] Swift, Adam.  “Inside the Standard Zuffa Contract,” Sherdog.com, October 31, 2000.  http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles.asp?n_id=9734.

[30] Id.

[31] Couture, at the time of executing his current promotional contract with Zuffa was in retirement.  He entered into a promotional contract with Zuffa, and his first fight upon returning was for the heavyweight title, against Tim Sylvia.  Thus, the inclusion of the champion’s clause is exactly the type of coercive provision the Ali Act would prohibit.

[32] MacLeod, Mike.  “Cuban Expounds on Ali Act,” fiveouncesofpain.com, January 31, 2008. http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2008/01/31/mark-cuban-expounds-on-ali-act/. Quoting interview conducted by Pramit Mohapatra of the Baltimore Sun.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] 15 USCA § 6307(b).  The one year limitation is not intended to apply to a contract where a promoter and fighter consensually enter into a long term contract, with the first bout for the fighter being specifically named, and in which the opponent is not under contract to the promoter.

[36] 15 USCA § 6308.

[37] Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act - (Extension of Remarks-May 25, 2000); Speech of Hon. William F. Goodling of Pennsylvania in the House of Representatives, Monday, May 22, 2000 [Page E844].

[38] 15 USCA § 6307(e).

[39] 15 USCA § 6307(g).

[40] 15 USCA § 6307(a).

[41] Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One-Hundred Eight Congress, First Session, February 5, 2003.

[42] Id.

In discussion with various individuals in the mixed martial arts industry, it is often said that while mixed martial artists should be afforded some form of protection, the Muhammad Ali Act is not applicable to mixed martial arts.  In support of this notion, it is said that the Muhammad Ali Act utilizes the terms “boxer” and “boxing,” and makes no mention of the terms “mixed martial arts” or “mixed martial artist.”

 

This article argues that despite the usage of the term “boxer,” the Muhammad Ali Act is still applicable to mixed martial arts and mixed martial artists.  To make this argument, an analysis of the history behind the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (the “Land Sales Act“) and its applicability to condominium sales is instructive.  As discussed below, the federal agency designated to administer the Land Sales Act determined that it applied to condominiums nine years before Congress used the term “condominium” at all. 

 

I.  Land Sales Act.¹

 

A.  Scope and Protections of the Land Sales Act.

 

The Land Sales act was enacted by Congress to combat fraud in the sale of land.  The Land Sales Act was the federal government’s response to widespread fraud occurring in the interstate sale of lands.  The use of mails for interstate land sales proliferated during the 1960’s, and abuses soon became widespread.² In general, these sales involved undeveloped realty, such as swampland in Florida, desert in Arizona, land under water or otherwise undevelopable.

 

The Land Sales Act, in summary, prohibits a “developer” from selling or leasing any “lot” in a “subdivision”, through the use of interstate commerce unless it complies with the Land Sales Act or falls within an applicable exemption.  Like the securities laws after which it was modeled, the Land Sales Act uses disclosure as it primary tool to combat fraud.

 

B.  Legislative History of the Land Sales Act.

 

As initially enacted by Congress, the Land Sales Act did not use the word “condominium” at all.  Many legal commentators and scholars believed the Land Sales Act did not apply to condominiums by intention of Congress and for policy reasons.  In drafting the statute to protect purchasers of land, Congress made the Land Sale Act applicable to “lots.”  Commentators presumed that Congressional usage of the term “lot” without inclusion of “condominium” supported the interpretation that the Land Sales Act applied only to raw land.

 

The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (”OILSR“), however, created by the Housing and Urban Development (”HUD“) agency to oversee the Land Sales Act, determined as early as 1969 that the Land Sales Act applied to condominiums.  Again, in 1972, OILSR issued an “advisory opinion which concluded that condominium units were included within the definition of ‘lots.’”³ OILSR subsequently formalized this interpretation of the Land Sales Act in the form of regulations.  According to the OILSR, a condominium is equivalent to a subdivision, with each condominium unit being a “lot.”

 

HUD issued a formal pronouncement in 1973, declaring that it interpreted the Land Sales Act to apply to condominiums, and stated that it consistently followed the same interpretation since 1969.  HUD reiterated the position of the OILSR in determining that the Land Sales Act applied to condominiums again in 1974.  In 1978, Congress amended the Land Sales Act, and for the first time, included the word “condominium” into a single provision.  Congress inserted the word “condominium” in a provision exempting sales of improved land under certain circumstances.  In enacting this amendment to the Land Sales Act, Congress again created fodder for debate.  One view interpreted this amendment as necessarily implying that the Land Sales Act was applicable to condominiums–otherwise, the inclusion of the term “condominium” in the exemption provision would be rendered superfluous.  The second view, however, imparted a much narrower intent on behalf of Congress in passing the amendment.  According to the second view, the amendment acted only to exempt land sales upon which a “condominium” rests.  This view is also supported by rules of statutory construction, which mandates that where Congress employs a term in one section of a statute, and not in another, the term should not be implied where it was excluded. ⁴

 

C.  Judicial Interpretation of the Land Sales Act.

 

In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the 11^th Circuit definitively ruled that the Land Sales Act applied to condominiums.⁵ In deference to the agency interpretation of HUD, and in implementing the antifraud and consumer protection purposes of the Land Sales Act, the court ruled that the Land Sales Act applied to condominiums.  The court, in reaching its conclusion, not only looked toward HUD’s interpretation of the Land Sales Act, but also towards the legislative history and purposes behind passage of the Land Sales Act.  The court noted that the legislative history of the Land Sales Act employs the terms “land” and “real estate,” in addition to the term “lots.” Thus, Congressional intent to prevent fraud in the sale of real estate, regardless of the form of ownership, should control.  In ruling that the Land Sales Act applied to condominiums, the court concluded that the fraudulent sale of land is “not rendered any less fraudulent if the condominium form of ownership is utilized.”⁶

 

II.  Imparting the Lessons of the Land Sales Act to the Muhammad Ali (Safety) Act.

The Land Sales Act was enacted to protect consumers in the purchase of “lots” from unscrupulous developers and promoters.  Despite the usage by Congress of the term “lots”, with no mention of the term “condominium”, HUD examined the legislative history and intent, and determined that the consumer protections and antifraud purposes behind the Land Sales Act applied equally to both raw land and condominium units.  Judicial interpretations of the Land Sales Act echoed HUD’s interpretation, even despite contrary evidence of Congressional intent.

 

Unlike the sale of interstate lands, there is no federal agency designated to oversee activities in boxing or mixed martial arts, despite prior legislative attempts.  Thus, no federal agency is available to issue agency interpretations applying the Muhammad Ali Act to boxers and mixed martial artists.  However, many members of the media and state athletic commissions have declared that the protections afforded by the Muhammad Ali Act to boxers are equally necessary for mixed martial artists.  Mark Cuban has stated publicly he believes the Muhammad Ali Act already applies to mixed martial arts.  Armando Garcia, commissioner of the California State Athletic Commission, believes similar protections should be afforded to mixed martial artists.  Fighters themselves believe the Muhammad Ali Act should apply to mixed martial artists, including, among others, Matt Lindland and Randy Couture.

 

Additionally, like the Land Sales Act, the legislative history of the Muhammad Ali Act indicates that Congress employed the terms “fighter” and “athlete” in addition to the term “boxer.”  Finally, the Congressional intent in passing the Muhammad Ali Act, namely, the protection of boxers from exploitive and coercive business practices, applies with equal force to the current status of mixed martial artists.  Thus, despite the Muhammad Ali Act’s usage of only the term “boxer,” as the history behind the interpretation and development of the Land Sales Act instructs, do not assume necessarily that the Muhammad Ali Act does not apply to mixed martial artists.

 

For a more expanded article on the Muhammad Ali Act’s applicability to mixed martial arts, please click here.

 

Rob Maysey is a licensed attorney in the states of Arizona, California, and Minnesota. He received his BA in Politics from Whitman College and his JD from Cornell Law School. He has followed the sport of mixed martial arts closely since being introduced to Brazilian jiu-jitsu in 1998 by a law school classmate.

 

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[1] 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701-1720.

[2] Olivier, James L.  “Beyond Consumer Protection:  The Application of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act to Condominium Sales,” University of Florida Law Review , 37 UFLLR 945 (1985).

[3] Id. At 951.

[4] Id. at 953.

[5] Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties, Inc., 777 F.2d 1444 (11^th Cir. 1985).

[6] Id. at 1448.

Sam Caplan, of Fiveouncesofpain.com, asked for just one GOOD reason as to why the Muhammad Ali Act Boxing Reform Act of 2000 (the “Muhammad Ali Act“) should be applied to Mixed Martial Arts (”MMA“).  Ask, and you shall receive.  Before I proceed further, let me first thank Mr. Caplan for taking the time to read and respond to my article, which delves into subject matter that many may find dull.  It is of the utmost importance, however, and Mr. Caplan’s time and effort in discussing the subject is greatly appreciated.

 

Immediately below, are six good reasons why the Muhammad Ali Act should be applied to mixed martial arts:

 

“The Congress makes the following findings:¹

 

(1) Professional MMA differs from other major, interstate professional sports industries in the United States in that it operates without any private sector association, league, or centralized industry organization to establish uniform and appropriate business practices and ethical standards.  This has led to repeated occurrences of disreputable and coercive business practices in the MMA industry, to the detriment of professional mixed martial artists nationwide.

 

(2) State officials are the proper regulators of professional MMA events, and must protect the welfare of professional mixed martial artists and serve the public interest by closely supervising MMA activity in their jurisdiction. State athletic commissions do not currently receive adequate information to determine whether mixed martial artists competing in their jurisdiction are being subjected to contract terms and business practices which may violate State regulations, or are onerous and confiscatory.

 

(3) Promoters who engage in illegal, coercive, or unethical business practices can take advantage of the lack of equitable business standards in the sport by holding MMA events in States with weaker regulatory oversight.

 

(4) The sanctioning organizations which have proliferated in the MMA industry have not established credible and objective criteria to rate professional mixed martial artists, and operate with virtually no industry or public oversight.  Their ratings are susceptible to manipulation, have deprived mixed martial artists of fair opportunities for advancement, and have undermined public confidence in the integrity of the sport.

 

(5) Open competition in the professional MMA industry has been significantly interfered with by restrictive and anticompetitive business practices of certain promoters and sanctioning bodies, to the detriment of the athletes and the ticket-buying public.  Common practices of promoters and sanctioning organizations represent restraints of interstate trade in the United States.

 

(6) It is necessary and appropriate to establish national contracting reforms to protect professional mixed martial artists and prevent exploitive business practices, and to require enhanced financial disclosures to State athletic commissions to improve the public oversight of the sport.”

 

Of course, the six items immediately above are the Congressional findings that were inserted into the Muhammad Ali Act.  I have taken the liberty to replace the word “boxer” with mixed martial artist, and the word “boxing” with “MMA” to vigorously illustrate how those Congressional findings apply with equal validity to the current state of the mixed martial arts industry.

 

Mr. Caplan objects to my arguments, using such colorful words as “ridiculous,” “gibberish,” and “nonsensical.”  Interestingly, the owners of the UFC have deemed the issue worthy enough to spend money lobbying against the Muhammad Ali Act’s application to mixed martial arts.² Unless the Fertitta brothers are in the habit of pursuing “gibberish” and the “nonsensical” by throwing cash its way, they must believe my arguments not only have merit, but may just be applied by a court of law.   The Fertitta brothers may be many things, but I haven’t heard them called fools.

 

The thrust of Mr. Caplan’s argument centers around the notion that the Muhammad Ali Act was written solely for boxing, and thus, necessarily, cannot be applied to MMA.  Mr. Caplan writes that my argument contains “a fatal flaw” because “nowhere in the Muhammad Ali Act does it contain the phrases ‘mixed martial art[ist]s’ or ‘mixed martial arts.’”³ Mr. Caplan, perhaps because his intent in responding to my article appears to have been dual, with equal parts devoted to criticizing my motives and responding to the substance of the article, appears to have missed the entire point of my prior article which can be read here.   Namely, despite not a single mention of the word “condominium” in the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (”Land Sales Act“), both the Housing and Urban Development agency and a court of law deemed the Land Sales Act applicable to condominiums before the word was ever used in the Land Sales Act.⁴

 

Next, Mr. Caplan argues that MMA and boxing are really just “apples and oranges,” and that the “business models of boxing and MMA are completely different.”  MMA and boxing are so different, according to Mr. Caplan, that MMA is actually more akin to MLB, the NFL, or NBA than it is to boxing.  Apparently, Caplan is mistaken in his belief that the UFC is modeled after these league sports, considering the UFC obtained sanctioning from the same athletic commissions that regulated boxing and continue to seek such sanctioning even today.  In fact, MMA is governed by the same existing regulatory structures in place for boxing, and many states’ MMA regulations are derived directly from the boxing counterparts.  Again, I have yet to hear anyone call the Fertitta brothers fools.

 

Mr. Caplan continues by stating in boxing, a fighter signs with a “manager and a promoter.”  The promoter, in Caplan’s view, actually serves “in a lot of ways” as a “second manager.”  In boxing, the “promoter controls your promotional fights and can tell you when, where, and who you will be fighting.”  In MMA, by contrast, a fighter signs with a “manager” and with a “promotion.”  Mr. Caplan then asks, apparently with a straight face, if the reader sees the difference.  I must admit, I myself do not.  Last time I checked, the UFC dictates who, when and where you fight as well.  Matt Lindland even commented on this practice, very recently, in an article posted on Mr. Caplan’s website.⁵ Finally, when a fighter signs a bout agreement with the UFC, the line where Zuffa signs says “Promoter” not “league.”  In practice and by law, they are a promoter.  And of course, to allow a promoter to be a manager would violate existing state laws and the Muhammad Ali Act.

 

Quite incredibly, in support of his position that the Muhammad Ali Act doesn’t apply to MMA, Mr. Caplan, as the rankings committee chair of WAMMA which promotes itself as the one and only legitimate sanctioning body in MMA, writes, “there is no rankings system, thus, no mandatory challengers or deadlines.”  Doesn’t the existence of a sanctioning body make the parallels between MMA and boxing all the more clear?

 

Mr. Caplan further illustrates these so called distinctions between boxing promoters and MMA promotions by claiming that in MMA, a “promotion is an actual company that has a brand identity.”  Apparently, the fact that in MMA “promotions” spend money establishing their own brand instead of, and indeed often in place of the fighters themselves, makes all the difference in the world.  I must admit, I found this attempted distinction between the “promoter” and “promotion” nonsensical.  Top Rank, Inc., last time I checked, was a legitimate company as well, with over seventy five (75) fighters on its roster.  Mr. Caplan is right, however, in that differences do exist.  In boxing, the promotional contract typically imposes duties upon the promoter to the fighter, whereas in MMA, this has been flipped on its head, and typically requires duties of the fighter, to the promoter.

Mr. Caplan then questions “the motives” of anyone who argues for the application of the Muhammad Ali Act to MMA.  I can’t speak for anyone else, but my motives are not hidden at all. I don’t own stock or other equity options in any promotion, and never have.  I am also not a member of any sanctioning body.  I do believe, however, that application of the Muhammad Ali Act to MMA will provide fighters with tools to combat exploitive and oppressive business practices, and thereby increase their market values.  I believe the disclosure mandates of the Muhammad Ali Act, flaws and all, are worlds better than what currently exists today, and will aid fighters in obtaining a fair share of the revenue.  I believe the prohibitions against certain conflicts of interest will also aid fighters in obtaining larger purses.

 

Next, Mr. Caplan suggests that the likes of me are probably acting strategically, in an “attempt to weaken the UFC’s market share.”  The last time I have checked, all of the major promotions operate under the same business model.  Indeed, the UFC’s contractual practices may be the least offensive.  If applied, the Muhammad Ali Act would impact all promotions alike.  At this point, I am beginning to wonder if Mr. Caplan’s disdain for the Muhammad Ali Act is an official WAMMA position, or if he is speaking for himself only. Indeed, I can think of few entities more hostile to the UFC’s well being than WAMMA itself.

 

Again, I would like to thank Mr. Caplan for taking the time to discuss this issue.  I would also like to thank Robert Joyner and MMAPayout.com as well.  This is an important issue, and worthy of debate.  Your recognition is appreciated.  I’m not sure why Mr. Caplan reacted to my article in a personal way, but I appreciate his enthusiasm.  In fact, I agree with and share Mr. Caplan’s thoughtful opinions when it comes to the need for a player’s association in MMA.  In fact, that is what the Mixed Martial Arts Fighters Association aspires to be.

 

Rob Maysey is a licensed attorney in the states of Arizona, California, and Minnesota. He received his BA in Politics from Whitman College and his JD from Cornell Law School. He has followed the sport of mixed martial arts closely since being introduced to Brazilian jiu-jitsu in 1998 by a law school classmate.

 

 

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[1] 15 USCA § 6301.  The findings are taken from the Muhammad Ali Act, and modified by the author by replacing “boxer” with “mixed martial artist” and ‘boxing” with “MMA” to illustrate my point with vigor.

[2] http://www.mmapayout.com/2008/05/ufc-hires-washington-lobbying-firm/.

[3] Caplan, Sam. http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2008/08/24/can-someone-please-offer-a-good-explanation-as-to-why-the-muhammad-ali-act-should-apply-to-mma/, fiveouncesofpain.com.

[4] Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, 380 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1977).

[5] http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2008/07/03/matt-lindland-claims-ufc-contracts-are-illegal/.

A Suggestion for the California State Athletic Commission.

On July 19, 2008, the Affliction promotion held their debut card in Anaheim, California. The following week, on July 26, 2008, EliteXC held its second “Saturday Night Fights” in Stockton, California. After an initial round of testing for performance enhancing and other illicit drugs was completed, one fighter was suspended by the California State Athletic Commission (“CSAC”).

 

On August 1, 2008, Bill Douglas, the Assistant Executive Officer of CSAC, informed MMAweekly that additional positive results would be announced, no earlier than August 11, 2008, after the initial round of testing indicated additional fighters tested positive for banned substances.¹ The news spread like wildfire across the internet, throughout the MMA blog world, news sites, and online message boards. CSAC also released the names of eight fighters for each of the Affliction and ProElite cards who had already been tested and cleared of illicit drug use. Finally, Mr. Douglas announced that the remaining results would likely be announced on August 11, 2008. This last announcement created a virtual frenzy, as fans and media members alike anxiously awaited the release, and watched it appear across news sites virtually simultaneously. Testing results, however, should not be treated as a staged event designed to obtain maximum anticipation and media coverage. The careers, reputations and lives of many athletes are negatively impacted, unnecessarily, by CSAC’s current disclosure policy.

 

With twenty-two (22) fighters appearing on the EliteXC card, and twenty (20) fighters on the Affliction card, fans quickly utilized the disclosures made by CSAC to eliminate those fighters whose results had already been revealed. A total of twenty-five (25) fighters remained whose test results were pending. Rampant rumor and speculation followed, with virtually all of the remaining twenty-five fighters being linked, at one time or another, to steroids or other illicit drug use.

 

A much better policy, I believe, would be to either (i) announce all drug testing results on one occasion, or (ii) respond to media inquiries by providing only the date that subsequent results will be announced. CSAC’s current practice unnecessarily creates tension for fighters, and leads to rumor and innuendo which is entirely unfair to the athletes who test clean. As well, false positives can and do sometimes occur. This fact, coupled with CSAC’s disclosure that additional positive results would be forthcoming, serves to disrupt the lives of the remaining twenty-five (25) fighters whose results had not yet been released. I see little benefit to CSAC in making the disclosures Mr. Douglas made to MMAweekly, and many benefits to the athletes, their families, friends and loved ones, in the policy I suggested above.

 

Rob Maysey is a licensed attorney in the states of Arizona, California, and Minnesota. He received his BA in Politics from Whitman College and his JD from Cornell Law School. He has followed the sport of mixed martial arts closely since being introduced to Brazilian jiu-jitsu in 1998 by a law school classmate.

[1] Hamlin, Tom. “More Positive Drug Test Results Appear Likely,” MMAweekly.com, http://www.mmaweekly.com/absolutenm/templates/dailynews.asp?articleid=6805&zoneid=13